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Abstract 
Consolidation in the banking industry has caused concern about the survival of small banks. 
However, empirical evidence shows that often small banks are performing better than larger banks 
in terms of loan growth and profitability. This paper addresses the main question of “how David can 
be successful in a Goliath’s world” analysing two broad sets of issues, tested on a sample of Italian 
small banks. We first address the question of whether peculiarities of small banks, e.g their ability 
to lever on relationship lending, are good explanatory variables of their loan growth. Second, we 
investigate the relationship between loan growth and profitability and credit risk to point out which 
small banks can continue to be a viable competitor of larger bank. 
 3
 Introduction 
Several trends in the financial industry have threatened the survival of small banks in recent 
years.   
Economies of scale in the production of financial services, sophisticated (and costly) risk 
management techniques, customers’ preference for one-stop-shopping, and the related bank’s need 
to diversify into different lines of business (and sources of revenues), the consolidation process in 
the bank sector,…..all are evidence of an economic arena where only large banks are seemingly fit 
to operate and survive. In a world made for Goliath, David might be at such a disadvantage that he 
will no longer survive. 
Despite these challenges, empirical evidence from the US and Italy shows that small banks 
not only survive, but also have been growing more rapidly than their larger competitors over the 
recent period, conquering new loan and deposit market shares at the expenses of large banks, while 
maintaining high profitability standards. 
A recent study of the drivers of the increased importance of Italian small banks suggests that 
their loan growth is to be mainly attributed to organizational diseconomies at large banks 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti et al.,2005). Indeed, large Italian banks are facing restructuring and re-
organizing problems after their numerous M&A operations and the introduction of more advanced 
risk management techniques, stimulated by the new capital adequacy regulatory rules (Basle 2). As 
a consequence, Italian small banks might be successful because large banks are retreating, making 
room to them. One possible conclusion is that the better performance of small banks appears to be a 
transitory phenomenon. As soon as large banks are back in action, small banks will lose their 
advantage.  
However, in our judgement, this conclusion is drawn without deeply exploring the wide 
literature on peculiarities of small local banks. Our paper levers on this literature and addresses the 
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main question of “how David can be successful in Goliath’s world”. Two broad sets of issues will 
be investigated. 
The first question is whether peculiarities of small banks are good explanatory variables of 
their loan growth. In particular, we posit that, in terms of loan growth, best performer in the small 
banking group are those banks who are good at ripening the hypothesized small bank advantages, 
such as their ability to process and use soft-information (Banerjee et al., 1994; Besley and Coate, 
1995; Stiglitz, 1990). Differently from previous literature which considers small banks as a unique, 
homogeneous group, or simply focuses on the sub-group of credit cooperatives, our study considers 
a sample of banks comprising three different types of small banks – cooperatives, small banks 
belonging to groups, independent small banks – and tries to highlight the importance of relationship 
lending for each type of bank organization1.  
Second, the relationship between loan growth and profitability and credit risk is analysed. In 
fact, a sizeable loan growth could be pursued accepting a higher risk profile and a reduction in 
profitability, with negative repercussions on their long run stability. If this is the case, the small 
banking group is likely to face soundness problems in the near future. Our main contribution 
consists in shedding light on what constitutes a fit shape for  a small bank in an era of consolidation. 
Combining our analysis with the results achieved by Bonaccorsi di Patti et al. (2005), we can 
construct a strategic matrix to identify which small banks are likely to continue to be viable 
competitors of larger banks, e.g. those able to combine structural advantages with a favourable 
situation in which large banks face difficulties in maintaining their loan market  share. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the motivation of research and 
reviews the relevant literature; Section 3 discusses our methodology and data;  Section 4 presents 
our results and Section 5 our conclusions. 
                                                 
1 This is particularly important since, in many countries, there is a trend which sees large banking groups re-discovering 
the importance of being close to their territory – at least for their retail banking activities – and tend to re-organize their 
businesses in different entities, comprising small local players. 
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2. Motivation of research and review of the empirical literature  
In recent years, in most developed countries, the survival of small banks has been threatened 
by various challenges: advances in IT, economies of scale in the production of new and more 
sophisticated financial instruments, innovations in bank production processes, e.g. the introduction 
of innovative (yet costly) risk management techniques, customers’ preference for one-stop-
shopping and the bank’s need to diversify into different lines of business (and sources of revenues). 
Last, but not least, worldwide the banking sector has undergone a substantial consolidation. These 
trends appear to favour  large banks at the expense of small banking institutions. All in all, in a 
world designed for Goliath, David might be at a disadvantage and find it particularly difficult to 
survive. As a matter of fact, the number of small banks has shrunk in most countries. This holds 
true for all types of banks, as a natural consequence of the process of consolidation which 
indistinguishably concerned all banking institutions. However, since small banks are a primary 
source of financing for small firms, the decline in the number of small banks has raised the concern 
that the access of small businesses to credit may be restricted. Therefore a fair amount of (mainly 
empirical) literature has been produced on the effect of bank consolidation on small business 
lending. In this specific area of study, an interest is cast on the potential differences in the way large 
and small banks approach small businesses. However, the real focus of these studies is on the 
availability of credit for small businesses after M&As (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berger et al., 
1998; Goldberg and White, 1998; Peek and Rosengren, 1998; DeYoung et al., 1999;  Boot, 2000; 
Ongena and Smith, 2000; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2001; Berger and Udell, 2002; Focarelli, 
Panetta and Salleo, 2002; Sapienza, 2002; Avery and Samolyk, 2004; Gobbi and Lotti, 2004).  
Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, the issue of survival (and the future) of small banks has been 
directly investigated by few studies.  
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For the U.S. banking system, Basset and Brady (2002) document that, during the period 
1985-2001, small bank assets have grown at rates exceeding their large bank competitors while 
maintaining their historically high levels of profitability, even if their average cost of deposits 
increased. The persistent competitiveness of small banks is related to their aggressive and 
apparently more profitable loan growth. 
More recently, DeYoung and Hunter (2002) and DeYoung et al. (2003) examine the 
comparative strengths and weaknesses of large and small banks (in the new more competitive and 
technological world) and outline a stylized “strategic map” of the banking industry that summarizes 
the past, present and potential future impact of environmental changes on the structure of the 
banking industry. Such a strategic framework supports the idea that well-managed community 
banks can financially outperform large commercial banks. The authors conclude that the 
community business model is financially viable and that well-managed community banks are likely 
to survive in the future. 
The only available study based on an international sample has been recently performed by 
the IMF; however, the study concentrates on a specific sub-sample of small banks, e.g. the 
cooperative banks, and confirms that cooperative banks are a growing part of many financial 
systems and show a lower volatility of returns (Hesse and Čihák, 2007). 
Outside the US, Pastré (2001) describes how “small is beautiful”, while Bonaccorsi di Patti 
et al. (2005) empirically study the determinants of Italian small banks’ out-performance in loan 
growth with respect to larger banks.  
The former study is a simple list of what Pastré calls the “six commandments” for small 
banks’ survival: 1) avoid businesses where economies of scales are predominant; 2) be specialized; 
3) be flexible; 4) avoid taking too much risk; 5) develop banking networks; 6) price risk correctly.   
The latter is an empirical investigation of what drives the rising loan and deposit market 
share of Italian small banks. The authors examine multiple demand and supply factors seemingly 
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correlated to the different loan growths experienced by small and large banks and conclude that 
small banks’ out-performance mainly depends on large banks’ loss of market grip. This group of 
banks is indeed facing restructuring and re-organizing problems after their M&A operations and the 
introduction of more advanced risk management techniques encouraged by the new regulatory rules 
for capital adequacy (Basle 2). Therefore, Italian small banks’ best performance appear to be a 
transitory phenomenon. As soon as large banks are back in action, small banks will lose their 
advantage.    
Indeed, Italy may represent a natural case-study. The process of consolidation among large 
banks has been impressive: between 1990 and 2001 more than 500 M&A occurred among banks 
accounting for 50% of total funds intermediated by the entire banking system (Panetta, 2005); 
however, almost all large Italian banks are still national champions which concentrate more than 
80% of their activities in national boundaries where, given the typical small size of Italian firms, 
they naturally operate in the same credit markets of small banks. On the other hand, somehow 
unexpectedly, small Italian banks have been increasing their loan and deposit market shares. As the 
Bank of Italy details in recent Annual Reports, smaller banks have been recording higher rates of 
growth in lending to firms and households than did other intermediaries. In 2004, small banks 
accounted for three quarters of new business; in 2005 they accounted for about half of the growth in 
lending to the private sector. As a consequence their market share increased both in lending to small 
firms and in loans to medium-sized and large companies2: they accounted for 25% of total loans in 
1999 and for 1/3 of total loans  in 2005. 
As the Italian small banking group is extremely heterogeneous, comprising credit 
cooperatives or joint-stock banks, specialized or universal banks, independent banks or banks 
affiliated to large groups, it is useful to investigate the drivers of their increased loan market share. 
Although small banks have taken advantage from their large competitors’ retreat, as highlighted by 
                                                 
2 Bank of Italy, Annual Reports (2004; 2005). 
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Bonaccorsi di Patti et al. (2005), our analysis can help to underline the specific features that can 
provide small banking institutions with a viable and successful survival strategy in an era of 
consolidation. 
In the following section, we discuss our hypothesis and data sources used in this 
investigation. 
 
3.  Hypothesis and research design 
Our paper address the main question of how David can be successful in a Goliath world by 
analysing two broad sets of issues. First, we address the question of whether relationship lending 
can help explain small banks increase in loan market share. Second, we investigate whether the 
conquest of loan market share has been done to the detriment of bank profitability and risk. In this 
section, we set out a discussion of the main testable hypothesis, describe the methodology and 
define the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
First of all, we analyse the impact of small bank characteristics (ability to develop 
relationship lending) on their loan growth.  
A substantial literature suggests that the development of strong bank-firm relationship helps 
the intermediation process via reduced information asymmetries and agency problems (Diamond, 
1984; Boot, 2000). As Berger and Udell (2002, p.1) state, “relationship lending is one of the most 
powerful technologies available to reduce information problems in small firms finance […]. Under 
relationship lending, banks acquire information over time through contact with the firm, its owner, 
its local community on a variety of dimensions and use this information in their decisions about the 
availability and terms of credit to the firm”. Therefore relationship lending is nested with the use of 
“soft information”, i.e. information that cannot be easily observed, verified and credibly transmitted 
from one agent to another. In markets characterized by strong competition and powerful pressures 
towards concentration (which means losing independency, for a small bank perspective) on the one 
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side, and an industrial structure based on small businesses, on the other side, specializing in 
relationship lending may prove strategic in surviving or even thriving. Small banks increasing their 
loan growth should be the ones who invest in relationship lending. 
The first testable hypothesis follows: 
H1: small bank loan growth is positively affected by the bank’s ability/willingness in 
investing in intense lending relationships. 
Small banks are deemed to be apter than large banks to develop relationship lending because 
they generally operate in a small community and are owned and/or managed by community 
members. Three sub-hypothesis are at work: “the long-term interaction hypothesis” (Banerjee et al., 
1994; Besley and Coate, 1995), the “peer monitoring hypothesis” (Stiglitz, 1990; Hoff and Stiglitz, 
1990) and the “functional proximity hypothesis” (Alessandrini et al, 2005). In the first case, taking 
active part in the life of a community, the bank shares relations of various kind, not only economic, 
through which relevant (and not necessarily hard) information can be acquired and used in its 
lending activity. Focusing on a different mechanism, the peer monitoring hypothesis considers a 
contract for which each member may continue to benefit from her loan only if all the others’ 
projects are successful, so members have an incentive to control each other. Making loans mainly to 
its members, a credit cooperative levers on the control incentive that neighbours face, thus 
contributing to a high loan repayment record. Effective peer monitoring is facilitated by the small 
size and the small area of operations of most credit cooperatives. Finally, the third hypothesis points 
out that bank organizational structure matters. As soft information is difficult to transmit and 
relationship lending is mainly based on “soft data”, relationship lending need to be associated with a 
fundamentally different lending process – than transaction-based lending - and therefore it requires 
a different organizational form (Ferri, 1997; Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger et al., 2002; Stein, 
2002; Scott, 2004). This stream of literature argues that large hierarchical firms (banks) may be at a 
disadvantage in transmitting the type of soft information associated with relationship lending, while 
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there is a strong incentive for soft-information production in small organizations. However, small 
size may not be a sufficient condition; the functional proximity between the local system where the 
bank operates and the decisional centre of the same bank might be relevant, as shown by Keeton 
(1995) and Alessandrini et al. (2005). Functional proximity concerns all banks that, given the 
localization of their decisional centre and strategic functions, are close to the areas where they 
operate. Being a small local bank is not a sufficient condition for being functionally proximate to its 
territory: if the bank belongs to a banking group, whose decisional centre and strategic functions are 
far from the bank’s territory, intrabank governance mechanisms may affect the credit process of the 
local affiliate up to the point that soft-information is no longer captured and used, with the final 
effect that credit to small, young, opaque firms is dampened. This suggests the second testable 
hypothesis: 
H2: small bank loan growth is positively affected by the local status of the bank. Finally, in 
a more competitive market, the choice about the business strategy becomes more relevant. A bank 
is mainly faced with two choices: diversify or specialize. In the last two decades product and market 
diversification has spread across the banking industry: mainly large, but also small banks have tried 
to increase the scope of their supply in order to offer their customers a greater variety of services 
while, at the same time, achieving cost and revenues economies of scope. However, there is no 
definitive evidence for the existence of scope economies (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger, 
Demsetz and Strahan, 1999). As a matter of fact, a recent trend in the banking industry is toward a 
re-focusing or “returning to the core” strategy. Small banks are faced with different strategies: 
specialize in lending, specialize in retail/private banking services, be a universal bank. In such a 
perspective, an increase in loan market share may depend on the fact that small banks have 
embraced a specific lending-oriented strategy.  
The third empirical prediction follows: 
H3: small bank loan growth is increasing with its commitment in specializing in lending.  
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In sum, we posit that, in terms of loan growth, best performers in the small banking group 
are those banks who are good at ripening the hypothesized small bank structural advantages 
discussed above.  
All predictions are tested through a traditional OLS and an ordinal logistic regression. In the 
first model, the dependent variable is the average loan growth that each bank experiences during the 
sample period (1989-2004) and is regressed on a vector of variables proxies for the following 
dimensions: Relationship Lending; Local Status; Strategy, Control Variables (see table 1). 
However, as we are interested in ascertaining whether the different degrees of loan growth amongst 
the small banking group could be ascribed to differences in the use of  their structural 
characteristics, the same exercise is run using an ordinal logit regression. Ordinal logistic regression 
assumes that the outcome variable can take on K+1 values coded 0,1,2,3….K3. In our study, the 
outcome variable (extent of loan growth) ranges from low to moderate to strong. Slow banks are 
defined as those which, at most, are able to mimic large banks loan growth; moderately fast bank 
are faster than the previous category and yet are slower than those banks experiencing a loan growth 
higher than the sample median. By use of a polytomous outcome variable we are able to identify the 
drivers of survival for small banks both within the small banks group and in comparison with the 
average rate of growth experienced by larger banks in the same period. In such a specification, the 
dependent variable is as follows: 
      =1  if g≤g1  slow banks 
Y(extent of bank j loan growth)  =2  if g>g1 and g<g2  moderately fast banks 
     =3  if g≥ g2   fast banks 
                                                 
3 It differs from a classical polytomous logistic regression in the fact that the outcome variable has a natural ordering 
among the K levels: common examples of ordinal outcomes include variables such as the extent of disease (none, some, 
severe), job performance (inadequate, satisfactory, outstanding); opinion on some issues (strongly disagree, disagree, 
agree, strongly agree). 
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where g is bank j loan growth; g1 is the average loan growth experienced by large banks 
during the same sample period (6,6%)4; g2 is the median loan growth of our sample of banks.  As 
before, independent variables are proxies for Relationship Lending; Local Status; Strategy, Control 
Variables. 
A second step of our analysis investigates the relationship between loan growth and 
profitability and credit risk. We explore possible combinations of “Non Performing Loans over 
Gross Loans” and “ROE” associated with a higher or lower probability of high loan growth. 
A classification and regression tree (CART) is used for this purpose. CART, a 
nonparametric regression and classification method originally introduced by Breiman et al. (1984), 
has a number of advantages over traditional parametric regression methods because it allows the 
relaxation of underlying assumptions, revealing interactions of covariates, and using them to 
improve the quality of the model5.  
 CART is particularly well suited for our purposes because, by simultaneously identifying 
significant clusters that exhibit relevant differences with respect to the dependent variable, it 
provides a unique insight into profitability and risk patterns that can be identified in the data. In 
other words, we are able to split our dataset  into relevant and homogeneous clusters that exhibit 
significant differences in their Non Performing Loans (NPL)/Gross Loans ratio and ROE with 
respect to the likelihood of being fast  banks. One potential drawback of CART rests in the fact that 
it requires a dichotomous dependent variable; consequently our tri-partition between slow, 
moderately fast and very fast banks has been collapsed into a binary variable, taking the value 1 if 
the bank is very fast and zero if the bank loan growth is below the value of the sample median. In 
other words, slow and moderately fast banks belong to the same partition (group). However, at this 
                                                 
4 See Bonaccorsi di Patti et al. (2005). During the same period, the entire population of small banking institutions 
benefited from a loan growth equal to 14%. 
5 In CART, the sample of subjects is systematically sorted into completely homogeneous subsets until a saturated tree is 
found. For each split, CART considers the entire set of available predictor variables to determine which one maximizes 
the homogeneity of the following two daughter nodes. This is a hierarchical process that reveals interdependencies 
between covariates. The process is continued until the nodes are completely homogeneous and cannot be split any 
further. See Breiman et al. (1984) for further details. 
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point of the analysis such a tri-partition is no longer necessary or more informative than a bi-
partition. In fact, our final goal is to provide a criterion to verify whether the very fast group is 
sound enough to survive and prosper in the future.   
CART enables to highlight the characteristics that better represent high performing/high 
growth banks (fit and fast), high performing/low growth banks (fit but slow), low performing/high 
growth banks (fat yet fast), low performing/low growth banks (fat and slow). 
 
3.1 Data description 
According to the Bank of Italy, the demarcation line between small and medium banks is set 
at € 7 billions total assets. Banks whose total assets fall below such a threshold are defined “small 
and minor” banks, amounting to 778 banks in 2004. “Minor banks” are mainly credit cooperatives 
operating in just one province with one or few branches; “small banks” are a more diversified group 
comprising local banks, independent banks or banks belonging to large groups, branches of foreign 
banks and banks specialized in private banking or leasing/factoring, consumer credit and investment 
banking.  
The Bankscope database covers more than 600 hundreds “small and minor” Italian banks, of 
which only 221 show data-series with no missing data during our sample period (1998-2004). These 
banks represent 16% of total loans  (national figures) and 47% of the total loans lent by “small and 
minor banks”. Except for foreign-controlled banks, all “small banks” are included in our sample (72 
out of 126 banks), while the remaining are minor banks. However, a dimensional bias does not 
arise: our sample does not cover only the larger of the “small and minor banks”; indeed 45% of our 
sample has less than 10 branches and the average total assets is less than 1 billion euros, while the 
median total assets is less than 500  million euros.  
While financial statement information is gathered from Bankscope, ownership and legal 
form information is taken from the Bank of Italy web site. Our sample period is 1998-2004. 
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3.2 Description of variables and descriptive statistics 
We first address the question of whether best performer in the small banking group are those 
banks who are better at ripening the hypothesized small bank advantages discussed in the prior 
section.  
Variable definitions are summarized in Table 1.    
Finding proxies for “Relationship Lending” is not an easy task. Prior empirical research has 
in fact studied relationship lending via field surveys addressed to samples of non-financial firms; in 
such studies, information on the number of  bank relations in force and the duration of the bank-
firm relationship were deemed good proxies for relationship lending. Absent such a set of 
information on banks’ customers, as it generally happens in bank balance sheets, we follow 
deYoung, Hunter and Udell (2003) and define whether a bank specializes in relationship banking or 
focuses on transaction-based activity by looking at the “Net Interest Margin”, i.e. the ratio of net 
interest income on total assets, and the ratio of “Loans to the Number of Bank’s Employees”. As the 
authors highlight, relationship lending generally requires a high touch, value added service supplied 
by the bank to its customers. Therefore it can expected that relationship loans require more attention 
and time by loan officers. All else being equal, high interest margins should be consistent with a 
high value added personalized banking strategy while low interest margins should be consistent 
with high volumes-low cost transactional banking strategies. Similarly, the lower the ratio of 
“Loans to the Number of Bank’s Employees”, the more intense the relationship lending, given that 
this tends to be more time consuming, in the bank’s view, as opposed to transaction-based lending.   
We are aware that several drawbacks arise with the use of the two above-said proxies.  
First, high margins could reflect low competition in markets where the bank operates. A 
bank with a high degree of market power operates as price setter, irrespective to the chosen lending 
strategy. Therefore a control variable capturing the degree of market power enjoyed by our sample 
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banks is added to the equation. “Degree of Market Power”  is constructed, for each bank, as 
follows: 
 
branches ofnumber    Total 
capitals  provincialnon  in    branches  ofNumber  Power)(Market =i  
We concentrate on branches in non-provincial capital as the number of banks operating in 
provincial capitals is quite high and increasing6. The same does not hold true when considering 
small municipalities and villages, where banks may still enjoy local monopoly power. Our 
expectation is that the higher the percentage of a bank’s branches in non provincial capital, the 
higher its market power. 
Second, using the Net interest margin as a proxy for relationship lending implies that that 
relationship loans are priced higher than transaction-based loans because their price include the 
value of the (relationship) services offered; however this may hold true if relationship loans show 
lower loan losses. In this respect we need to control for credit risk and therefore the ratio of “non 
performing loans/gross loans” is added. 
Even in the case of the ratio “Loans to the Number of Bank’s Employees” a drawback exists, 
since a low ratio may reflect a bank’s inefficiencies or even the presence of diseconomies of scale. 
The “Cost Income” ratio is therefore added to the equation in order to control for bank’s efficiency, 
while diseconomies of scale are controlled by the natural logarithm of Total Assets.  
The extent of a bank “Local Status” is proxied by two dummy variables: Cooperative and 
Thinking Head. The former takes the value 1 if a small bank is a credit cooperative and zero 
otherwise  and represents a proxy for both the “long-term interaction hypothesis” and the “peer 
monitoring hypothesis” (Angelini et al., 1998). Second, we posit that being independent, i.e. not 
belonging to a group, increases a bank’s ability to capture and use soft-information in lending 
                                                 
6 The number of bank branches has been continuously increasing starting from 1990 and it has mainly concerned large 
municipalities and provincial capitals. 
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decisions. Following Alessandrini et al.(2005) “Thinking Head” is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if a bank is independent or head of a group and zero if it belongs to a group. 
 The strategy of focusing in lending activity can be detected by three different variables: the 
ratio of loans to total assets, the ratio of net interest revenue to total revenue and leverage. The first 
ratio helps detect the existence of a consolidated strategy in the business of lending and should 
reflect positively on a bank loan growth. Higher values of the second ratio are signs of a strategy 
diversifying-oriented which could help delivering a relationship approach. In fact, a bank that 
increases its supply by distributing a range of services without reducing its propensity to lend is 
positively perceived by customers as a true universal bank where one-stop-shopping is possible. 
Finally, fast growing banks are expected to have a higher equity to total assets ratio to fund their 
riskier strategy. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the explanatory variables over the years 1998-2004. 
We also break up our sample into “slow”, “moderately fast” and “fast” banks according to whether 
their average loan growth over the sample period was respectively lower than the average loan 
growth experienced by large banks (6.6%), ranged between 6,6% and the sample median, was 
higher than the sample median. A Kruskall-Wallis test for differences in medians is applied across 
the tri-partition. With reference to “slow” and “moderately fast” banks, “fast” banks are more likely 
to be better capitalized (Equity/Total Assets), less risky and more profitable in terms of ROE and 
ROA, making relatively more loans, as a percentage of total assets, show higher net interest 
margins, be more likely independent and credit cooperative banks. Last but not least, fast banks are 
significantly smaller than the other two partitions. 
4. Empirical Results  
4.1  OLS and Logit results 
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Tables 3 and 4 present the results of OLS and logit estimations, respectively. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. From our sample of 221 banks we excluded firms for which the required data 
were missing or that clearly presented outlying values; we therefore ended up with 195 banks.  
Column 2 of Table 3 shows the results of our model specification as detailed in Section 3: 
the dependent variable, the 1998-2004 average loan growth, is regressed against proxies for 
relationship lending, localism, strategic patterns and control variables. All the variables in the 
equation show the expected sign with the exception of Cost Income; most of the proxies for 
structural peculiarities of small banking institutions are also statistically significant. In particular, 
loan growth is positively affected by being a credit cooperative, investing in relationship lending 
(net interest margin), specializing in lending while generating higher amounts of noninterest 
income, and being more capitalized. Being independent does not add to a bank’s ability in using 
soft-information in its lending activity and loan growth: “Thinking Head” is in fact not statistically 
significant.  
In order to check for the robustness of our estimates with respect to their power of capturing 
the extent of relationship lending net of banks’ market power, we decided to estimate a second 
model. This is a two-stage model, where in the first-stage we regress “Net Interest Margin” on 
“Market Power” and “Credit risk”; in the subsequent, second-stage, the estimated residuals are 
included as an explanatory variable (proxy for relationship banking, net of market power and credit 
risk) for estimating the effects of relationship lending on loan growth. Results of this model are 
reported in column 3. Relationship lending is confirmed as a relevant variable for loan growth.  
Table 4 presents the results of the ordinal logit regression with the same specifications used 
in the OLS exercise. The ordinal dependent variable classifies our sample of banks according to 
their loan growth: slow banks – with a loan growth ≤ the average loan growth experienced by large 
banks in the same period (6,6%); moderately fast banks – with a loan growth ranging between 6,6% 
and the sample median; fast banks – with a loan growth higher than the sample median. 
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The logit model shows a good predictive power: 60% of banks are correctly classified, while 
Nagelkerke R-squared is equal to 39%. All the variables in the equation show the expected sign and 
results confirm that different degrees of loan growth amongst the small banking group are driven by 
relationship lending, localism (dummy cooperative), and strategy. For instance, the estimated 
coefficient of the variable “cooperative” means that non cooperative banks are less than 1/12 as 
likely to have a higher loan growth compared with cooperative banks.7 In sum, the more banks lever 
on their structural characteristics, the higher their loan growth.  
Column 3 presents a second specification of the logit model, where the two proxies for 
localism - cooperative and thinking head - are substituted by a polytomous variable, named “Degree 
of Localism” able to directly capture both aspects of localism. The new variable takes the value 0 
when a bank is neither independent nor cooperative (no localism); the value 1 when the bank is both 
independent and cooperative (strongest degree of localism); the value 2 when the bank is 
independent and yet not cooperative (mild degree of localism); the value 3 when the bank is 
cooperative but not independent8.  
Degree of Localism  Thinking head 
 0 1 
0 0 2 Cooperative  
1 3 1 
 
Previous results are confirmed while the new variable uncover the effect of being 
independent or thinking head. In fact, being strongly local (both cooperative and independent) has a 
stronger positive effect on a bank’s loan growth than being just independent (or mildly local); at the 
same time, independent banks are better off with respect to small banks belonging to groups as the 
negative sign of the coefficient for “Degree of localism=0” highlights.    
                                                 
7 The logistic coefficients can be interpreted as the change in the log odds associated with a 1 unit change in the 
independent variable. Since its easier to think of odds rather than log odds, the e raised to the power of Bi is the factor 
by which the odds change when its independent variable increases by 1 unit.  
8 This category cannot have observations at all and is not reported in table 4. 
 19
 
4.2  Classification tree results 
CART tree is shown in graph 1 and the results are summarized in table 5. Our sample is 
partitioned into five groups, according to their profitability and risk patterns with respect to the 
likelihood of being fast growing banks. Therefore, we end up with five clusters of banks exhibiting 
the following strategies with respect to loan growth, profitability and credit risk (table 5): 
Group 1: fat and slow: the cluster exhibits a low loan growth and a high level of NPL to 
gross loans; 
Group 2: semi-fit and fast: on average the cluster exhibits high loan growth, combined with 
the highest ROE (> 7%) and a medium level of NPL to gross loans (laying in the interval 
4%-14%, with a mean of 5,22%); 
Group 3: fat yet fast: on average the cluster exhibits high loan growth combined with a low 
performance in both ROE and NPL to gross loans; 
Group 4:  semi-fit and fast: on average the cluster exhibits high loan growth, combined with 
a medium ROE and the lowest level of NPL to gross loans; 
Group 5: semi-fat and slow: on average the cluster exhibits a low loan growth, combined 
with a medium ROE and a medium level of NPL to gross loans. 
 
4.3 Logit and CART analyses combined 
A further step of our analysis combines the results of the logit exercise with those of the 
CART analysis: our aim is to verify how the various small banks’ peculiarities and strategic 
patterns in lending activity, that proved to be significant in explaining small banks’ high loan 
growth, are allocated among our clusters. Each cluster’s characteristics are reported in table 6. A t-
test for differences in means is also reported. If all the above mentioned characteristics hold true, 
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potential differences in means between the entire fast group (column II) and the fast clusters (G-2; 
G-3; G-4) should show no statistical significance. On the contrary, we expect statistically 
significant differences in mean values between the two slow clusters (G-1 and G-5) and the entire 
fast group. 
The two best performer clusters (G-2 and G-4) differ in their choice of profitability (ROE) 
and risk (NPL/Loans). G-4 banks show a more prudent strategy: they target a lower risk-return 
combination and maintain a higher capital ratio. This result is obtained notwithstanding the lower 
presence of credit cooperatives in the cluster, i.e. banks which are well known for their low appetite 
for risk and are not subject to the constraint of maximizing shareholders’ value. An alternative 
explanation of the different strategies adopted by G-2 and G-4 may reside in the fact that G-2 
comprises a higher percentage of banks affiliated to groups (24% and 13% respectively): a parent 
bank may be prone to short-termism in the trade-off between profitability and risk.  
G-3 comprises few banks (7), most of which belong to large bank groups and tend to be 
specialized in corporate or private banking. All the banks in the cluster are characterized by very 
low ROE (mean value 0.35%, standard deviation 1.8%).     
G-1 and G-5 clusters share similar value for ROE (5%), while G-1 banks exhibit the highest 
level of NPL on gross loans (20.02%), which is in part due to the fact that the group comprises the 
highest percentage of banks located in regions where credit risk is systematically higher (Southern 
regions) and a lower percentage of credit cooperatives.  
The fast growth of the two “virtuous” groups (G-2 and G-4) goes hand in hand with a 
greater propensity to lever on relationship lending (either highest Net Interest Margin or lowest ratio 
of Loans/N. of Employees), with the strongest local status (highest percentage of cooperatives), 
with greater focus on lending activity (Loans/Total assets). G-2 and G-4 are truly fast groups: those 
banks classified as zero in graph 1 belong to the moderately fast group as defined in the first part of 
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the empirical analysis, e.g. out of 85 banks belonging either to G-2 or G-4, 279 experience a loan 
growth below the value of the sample median but higher than the average growth of large Italian 
banks. These banks share the very same characteristics of risk-return with very fast (and semi-fit) 
banks and yet they do not grow at the same rate. In fact, they do not lever on relationship lending, 
degree of localism, etc.…with the same degree of very fast banks as shown by the ordinal logit 
exercise. Indeed, this help explain why not all the mean values of our proxies for local status, 
relationship lending and strategic patterns are statistically “equal” to the sample mean of the entire 
fast group.  
Similarly, G-3 banks’ fast growth do not seem to be driven by relationship lending or 
localism; besides, it is not founded on good fundamentals, too. Indeed, their growth is less likely to 
be tenable in the future.  
Finally, the slow performance of G-1 and G-5 could be ascribed to the absence or a misuse 
of those structural factors that should characterize small banks. In fact, G-1 and G-5 comprise 21 
slow banks, 52 moderately fast banks and 30 very fast banks10. Notwithstanding their different 
growth patterns, these banks are similar in their being “fat” in terms of ROE and risk. In other 
words, levering on relationship banking, proximity, or focusing on lending is a necessary condition 
for loan growth, yet it is not a sufficient one in order to sustain such a growth in the long run.  
Combining together all the potential drivers of small banks’ recent exceptional growth, a 
“strategic map” can be constructed (Table 7). The map is 3x3 matrix which considers, on the one 
side, the “transitory factors hypothesis” – i.e., large banks are facing (transitory) organizational 
problems and left room to small banks growth – and, on the other side, the “structural factors 
hypothesis”, - e.g. small banks can lever on their own specificities, combined with an ability to 
control risk and profitability, in order to survive and flourish even in a more inhospitable world -.  
                                                 
9 These are the 0 clusters of G-2 and G-4: respectively 21 (out of 22) and 6 (out of six). See graph 1. Only one bank 
(belonging to G-2) shows a loan growth below the 6.6% threshold. 
10 These latter are the 1 clusters of the two groups: respectively 5 and 25. See graph 1. 
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Such analysis allows to make use of the initial tri-partition between “slow”, “moderately fast” and 
“very fast” banks. In fact, banks can react to their larger competitors’ transitory difficulties by 
showing a fast loan growth, a moderate loan growth or a slow loan growth11. Therefore, banks in 
each cluster are analysed and re-classified according to their loan growth. For instance, all G2 and 
G4 banks show either a fast or a moderately fast loan growth and are to be assigned to the first and 
second column of Table 7. Their exact position within the matrix is now determined by the results 
of the logit exercise, which has shown that the higher the exploitation of structural factors, the more 
likely the bank’s loan  growth. Therefore, “very fast” banks in G2-G4 clusters are allocated in the 
left upper cell while “moderately fast” banks  in G2-G4 are assigned in the central cell.  
Making use of such a “strategic matrix”, our study provides a criterion to highlight which 
small bank business model is still economically viable. As a matter of fact, it appears that 29% of 
our entire sample of small banks will be able to survive and prosper even when the causes of large 
banks’ difficulties will disappear. Other strategic paths can be sketched as follows. First, 14% of the 
sample, made up of moderately fast banks, could easily follow the leaders if these banks were to 
invest more on structural factors. Second, absent structural determinants of growth, banks may 
evolve in subsequent paths implying a reduction of their loan growth, with a final, unavoidable, way 
out. This appears to be the most likely immediate fate for a 12% of our sample, given their low 
growth, bad fundamentals and scarce reliance on relationship lending. For the remaining banks 
(45% of sample), investing in structural drivers of growth represents the crucial choice that these 
banks will face in order to survive in the next future.  
 
5. Conclusions 
                                                 
11 Where a bank is defined as fast, moderately fast and slow according to their loan growth: slow banks – with a loan 
growth ≤ the average loan growth experienced by large banks in the same period (6,6%); moderately fast banks – with a 
loan growth ranging between 6,6% and the sample median; fast banks – with a loan growth higher than the sample 
median. 
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This study provides a two-step evaluation of the potential for survival of small banks in a 
Goliath world. 
In the first step, we demonstrate that most of the peculiarities of small banks, i.e. localism 
and relationship lending, are good explanatory variables of their recent high loan growth. Exhibiting 
strategies focusing on lending activity and being more capitalized matters as well.   
The second step explores the relationship between loan growth and profitability and credit 
risk. We end up with five groups of banks that exhibit the following strategies: a) two semiFit & 
Fast clusters: high performing banks – in terms of low NLP/Loans and high ROE-  with high loan 
growth; b) one Fat and Fast cluster - low performing banks with high loan growth; c) two Fat and 
Slow clusters - low performing banks with low loan growth. 
In sum, the small banks’ group is not homogeneous in its loan growth which, for best 
performer, is driven by structural factors, such as the ability to lever on their local status, on 
relationship lending and to control credit risk while pursuing a good level of profitability as well. 
As such, their growth may not be a transitory phenomenon, depending on the fact that large 
Italian banks are facing difficulties in maintaining their market share due to potential organizational 
diseconomies combined with a possible reconsideration of their lending policies, more centred on 
the use of credit scoring techniques. Making use of a “strategic matrix”, our study provides a 
criterion to highlight which small bank business model is still economically viable. In fact, it 
appears that 44% of our sample of small banks will be able to survive and prosper even when the 
causes of large banks’ difficulties will disappear, thanks to their ability of levering on those 
structural drivers of growth such as relationship lending. Our study confirms the results obtained in 
the US market (deYoung, Hunter, Udell, 2003),  e.g. small bank business model is still viable even 
in a world of Goliaths but it takes a well-run organizations to make it work.    
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Tables and figures 
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Table 1 Independent variables: definition of the variables and expected sign of coefficients 
 Variable name  Definition Expected effect on loan growth 
Net Interest 
Margin 
The ratio of net 
interest revenue on 
total assets 
+ Greater attention to relationship lending is 
the driver of high loan growth: the higher 
the interest margins the most probable a 
high value added personalized banking 
strategy is at work with positive effects on 
loan growth 
  
Loans / Number 
of employees 
The ratio of Loans to 
the number of bank’s 
personnel (in natural 
logarithms) 
- Greater attention to relationship lending is 
the driver of high loan growth: the lower 
the number of loans per personnel the most 
probable a high value added personalized 
banking strategy is at work with positive 
effects on loan growth 
Cooperative Dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if a 
bank is a cooperative 
and 0 otherwise 
+ Proxy for the positive effects of “peer 
monitoring” and “long term” hypotheses 
on banks’ lending patterns 
 Thinking Head Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a 
bank is independent 
and 0 if it belongs to 
a group 
+ Decision-making autonomy can foster  
bank’s ability to use soft information in its 
lending activity 
Loans/Total 
Assets  
The ratio of Loans to 
Total assets  
+ A strategy that focus on lending activity 
reflects positively on loan growth  
Net Interest 
Revenue/ Total 
Revenue 
The ratio of net 
interest revenue to 
total revenue 
- Lower values are signs of strategy that 
focuses on diversification in order to 
improve the relationship approach   
Equity /Total 
Assets 
The ratio of bank’s 
equity to total assets 
+ Faster banks need more capital to fund 
their (riskier) strategy  
Total Assets Total assets (in 
natural logarithms)  
? Dimension matters? 
Cost / Income Cost income ratio - More efficient banks are deemed to grow 
faster 
 
Market Power The ratio of the 
number of branches 
in non provincial 
capitals over total 
number of branches 
+ Greater market power influence pricing  
 Credit risk The ratio of non 
performing loans 
over total loans 
- Greater attention to relationship lending 
should help in reducing adverse selection 
of borrowers 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics 
The following table presents means and medians for the explanatory variables over the sample period 1998-2004. 
Column 2 and 3 refer to the whole sample of 221 small banks. Columns 4-6 present medians for the tri-partition “slow 
growth”, “moderate growth” and “fast growth” : specifically, banks are grouped within the “slow growth” group if their 
loan growth ≤ the average loan growth experienced by large banks in the same period (6,6%); within the “moderate 
growth group if their loan growth ranges between 6,6% and the sample median; within the “fast growth group” if their 
loan growth is higher than the sample median. A Kruskall-Wallis test for differences in medians is applied across the 
tri-partition: statistical significance for the test at the 10%, 5% or 1% level are indicated by *, **; *** respectively.  
Variable  
 
Sample 
mean Sample 
median  
 
Median 
when slow 
growth 
median when 
moderate 
growth 
median when 
fast growth 
Loan Growth 98-04 14.71 13.58 3.27 11.15 17.86 
ROE 7.04 6.81 4.73*** 6.56*** 7.70*** 
NPL/Gross Loans 8.71 6.71 11.21*** 7.10*** 5.57*** 
 Total Capital ratio 19.66 16.30 15.11 17.04 16.03 
Net Interest Margin 3.51 3.56 3.23*** 3.52*** 3.64*** 
 Cost Income 73.38 72.74 76.80 72.20 72.38 
Operating Costs/ Total 
Earning Assets 
3.31 
3.27 3.37 3.28 3.19 
Personnel Costs/ N. of 
employees 57.11 55.12 54.97 55.88 55.03 
Personnel Costs / 
Total Assets 1.63 1.65 1.57 1.62 1.67 
 Loans/ N. of 
employees  2,510 2,036 1,771 2,022 2,101 
 ROA .80 0.80 0.47*** 0.77*** 0.88*** 
Net Interest Revenue 
/Total Revenue 77.25 78.81 76.83 78.97 78.83 
Loans/Total Assets 65.16 66.83 55.12** 65.11** 70.84** 
Equity/Total Assets 13.96 12.72 9.63*** 12.57*** 13.48*** 
 Total Assets (th €) 923,622 391,486 1,250** 417,357** 324,486** 
N. of employees 283 100 264 126 93 
 Frequency 
N. banks 221 25 85 111 
Cooperative (dummy) 119 5 42 72 
Thinking Head 
(dummy) 164 11 64 89 
Specialized (dummy)  20 8 4 8 
North  111 9 45 57 
Centre 64 5 23 38 
South  44  11 17 16 
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Table 3. OLS results for loan growth(1).  
The dependent variable is the average loan growth over the period 1998-2004 for our sample of banks. In model I 
explanatory variables are proxies for localism, relationship lending activities, strategic patterns, control variables as 
reported in Table 2. Model II is a robustness check of our estimates to capture the extent of relationship lending net of 
banks’ market power; it includes the residuals of a regression where “net interest margin” is the dependent variable and 
“market power” and “Non performing loans/gross loans” are the  explanatory variables. Standard errors in parenthesis; 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% level are indicated by *, **; *** respectively.  
 Model I Model II 
Constant 
-1,03 
(24,00) 
27.119 
(18.89) 
Net Interest Margin 2.90 
  (1.28)** 
  
- 
Residuals (Relationship 
lending net of Market Power 
and credit risk) 
- 2.13  (1.22)* 
Loans/ n. of Employees (in log) -0.70 
(2.90) 
-3.03 
(2.66) 
Cooperative  3.66 
  (1.68)** 
5,09 
    (1.62)*** 
Thinking Head  1.44 
(1.45) 
1.29 
(1.46) 
Loans/Total Assets 0.10 
(0.06)* 
0.16 
    (0.06)*** 
Equity/ Total Assets 0.79 
   (0.07)*** 
0.81 
   (0.07)*** 
Net Interest Revenue /Total 
Revenue 
-0.32 
     (0.08)*** 
-0.35 
    (0.07)*** 
Total Assets (in log) 0.70 
(0.62) 
0.68 
(0.61) 
Cost income 0.10 
  (0.05)** 
0.05 
(0.05) 
Market Power  -0.01 
(.02) - 
NPL/loans -0.22 
  (0,09)** - 
   
   
N. of observations 195 195 
R squared 58,1% 56.2% 
Durbin Watson Statistic 2,097 2,080 
 
 
(1) Analysis of residuals confirms their Normal distribution; A weak collinearity between LOAN/TA and LOAN/n. of 
employees is detected, with a VIF equal to 5.0; however, such a VIF level can be easily accepted as the typical critical 
value for multicollinearity is a VIF ≥ 10 (Fox, J. (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eliminato: N
Eliminato: ,
Eliminato: employess 
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Table 4 Logit results for loan growth.  
The dependent variable is a polytomous ordinal response that classifies our sample of banks according to their loan 
growth: slow banks – with a loan growth ≤ the average loan growth experienced by large banks in the same period 
(6,6%); moderately fast banks – with a loan growth ranging between 6,6% and the sample median; fast banks – with a 
loan growth higher than the sample median. In model I explanatory variables are proxies for localism, relationship 
lending activities, strategic patterns, control variables as used in the OLS specification.  In model II, the polytomous 
variable, “Localism Degree”, substitutes the two dummies Cooperative and Thinking Head, taking the value 0 when a 
bank is neither independent nor cooperative, the value 1 when the bank is both independent and cooperative; the value 2 
when it is independent and yet not cooperative. Standard errors in parenthesis; statistical significance at the 10%, 5% or 
1% level are indicated by *, **; *** respectively.  
 Model I Model II 
   
Residuals (Relationship 
lending net of Market Power 
and credit risk) 
1.37 
    (0.42)*** 
1.37 
    (0.42)*** 
Loans/ n. of Employees (in log) -1.50 
(0.91)* 
-1.50 
(0.91)* 
Cooperative = 0  -2.47 
    (0.58)*** - 
Thinking Head = 0  -0.63 
(0.45) - 
Localism Degree = 0 - -0.63 (0.45) 
Localism Degree = 1  2.47   (0.58)*** 
Loans/Total Assets 0.05 
   (0.02)*** 
0.05  
    (0.02)*** 
Equity/ Total Assets 0.04 
 (0.03)* 
0.04 
(0.03)* 
Net Interest Revenue /Total 
Revenue 
-0.06 
(0.02)** 
-0.06 
  (0.02)** 
Total Assets (in log) 0.25 
(0.20) 
0.25 
(0.21) 
Cost income -0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
 (0.02) 
   
Growth =1 -14.37 
(6.71) 
-11.90 
(6.71) 
Growth =2 -11.53 
(6.67) 
-9.07 
(6.67) 
N. of observations 195 195 
Negelkerke R squared 39.0% 39.0% 
Test of parallel lines12 
Null Hypothesis 
Chi-square 
 
302.09 
(7.45) 
 
302.09 
(7.45) 
 
                                                 
12 Test of the hypothesis that the location parameters are equivalent across the levels of the dependent variable. The 
results of the chi-square test statistic are not significant indicating that the assumption is tenable. 
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Table 5 Clusters’ risk, profitability and loan growth rate 
Clusters’ characteristics with respect to profitability and credit risk and their being fast or slow banks. Banks are defined 
as fast when their loan growth is higher than the sample median. 
      NPL/grossLoans 
ROE 
> 14% ]4, 14%] <=4% 
<=1,7% 
 G3- fast banks 
 
 
]1,7%-7%] G1-slow banks G5-slow banks G4- banks 
>7%  G2 - fast banks  
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Table 6 Clusters’ summary statistics. 
The following table reports mean values for a set of explanatory variables that help further characterize the five clusters 
identified via CART analysis. Columns 2 reports the mean values for the sample of fast banks: banks are defined as fast 
when their loan growth is higher than the sample median. A one sample t-test for differences in means is applied to each 
cluster with respect to the fast group: H0: group mean = fast group mean; statistical significance at the 10%, 5% or 1% 
level are indicated by *, **; *** respectively. For categorical variables, a chi-square goodness of fit test is applied. 
 Mean 
when 
fast 
G-2 
semi-fit 
and fast 
G-4 
semi-fit 
and fast 
G-3 
fat yet 
fast 
G-1 
fat and 
slow 
G-5 
semi-fat 
and slow 
Number of 
banks in cluster 
92 69 16 7 33 70 
% of very fast 
banks 
100% 68.2% 62.5% 71.4% 15.2% 35.7% 
% of moderately 
fast banks 
- 30.4% 37.5% - 54.5% 48.6% 
% of slow banks - 1.4% - 28.6% 30.3% 15.7% 
NPL to Gross 
loan (mean 
value) 
6.97% 5.75%*** 3.19%*** 6.37% 20.02%*** 8.07%***
ROE (mean 
value) 
7.37% 9.64%*** 6.07%*** 0.35%***
 
5.22%*** 
 
5.6%*** 
 
Total capital 
ratio (mean 
value) 
20.78% 18.06% 24.11% 17.08% 24.23% 19.38% 
% in Southern 
regions 
12% 7.25% 0% 0% 72.7% 15.7% 
% of specialized 
banks 
2% 2.89% 0% 42.9% 12.1% 4.3% 
% of thinking 
heads 
88% 76%*** 87% 57.1%** 69.7%*** 81.4%* 
% of 
cooperatives 
65% 62% 56% 14.3%*** 48.5%** 54.3%* 
Net interest 
margin 
3.65 3.60 3.44*** 2.90 3.53 3.50*** 
Loans /Number 
of employees 
2,074 2,282** 2,008 3,859 2,341 2,216 
Loans/Total 
Assets 
66.93 68.43 68.24 72.14 53.46*** 64.03* 
Equity/Total 
Assets 
15.30 12.91*** 14.68 29.20 13.26** 13.47*** 
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Table 7  A strategic map 
Banks in clusters are allocated in the 3x3 matrix according to their loan growth and their ability to grow thanks to 
“transitory factors” and to “structural factors”. The “transitory hypothesis” states that large banks are facing (transitory) 
organizational problems and left room to small banks growth; the “structural factors hypothesis” states that. small banks 
can lever on their own specificities, combined with an ability to control risk and profitability. 
Driven by transitory factors 
(e.g. transitory large banks organizational problems) 
Growth Yes 
(fast growth) 
Partially 
(moderate 
growth) 
No 
(slow growth) 
Yes G2 - G4 
(29% of sample) 
 
 
Partially 
 
G2 - G4 
(14% of sample)
 
Driven by 
structural factors 
(e.g. localism, 
relationship 
lending, focus 
on lending 
activity, good 
combination of 
profitability and 
credit risk) No G1 - G5 - G3 
(18% of sample) 
G1- G5 
(27% of sample)
G1 - G5 - G3 
(12% of sample) 
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Graph 1 Classification Tree.  
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a bank’s loan growth is greater than the sample 
median, and zero otherwise. Independent variables are NPL/Gross Loans and ROE. Overall classification ability is 
equal to 70%. 
 
 
G1 
G2 
G3 
G4 G5 
Legenda: 
Miglioramento = Improvement 
Nodo = Node 
Categoria = Category 
Totale= Total 
